Introduction
Certification programs-organized and coordinated by non-state actors to address social and environmental challenges in numerous economic sectors-exemplify efforts to govern by disclosure. Some hope certification will be a tool for NGOs, investors, governments, and consumers to, via labeled products, identify and support high performers, and hence, place upward pressure on sector-wide practices. Beyond this simple appraisal, however, unanswered questions remain concerning the practice and consequences of transparency by non-state certification.
Using a comparative, programmatic analysis, this chapter presents a critical analysis of transparency in non-state certification in two ways. First, we compare certification initiatives in the forest and fisheries sectors, primarily focusing on the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) and the Marine Stewardship Council (MSC), to assess the transparency of and for private governance and its consequences for legitimacy and accountability. 3 To do so, we assess not only what information is disclosed but also, via rules for participation, which actors define, control, and have access to it. Through this lens, important differences across programs emerge. As a membership organization, the FSC allows direct participation in rule-making processes through, for instance, National Initiatives charged with localizing the program's global standard. The MSC, by contrast, formed as a partnership initiative of the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) and Unilever that sought to create an FSC-type organization for seafood. 4 Other stakeholders were quickly included via workshops and outreach seeking feedback on standards development.
Yet, the partners purposefully avoided copying the FSC's approach to membership and its national affiliates for localizing global standards.
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The contrasting paths of the FSC and MSC shed light on the relationships between, on the one hand, transparency and participation and, on the other, legitimacy and accountability. The MSC's pursuit of legitimacy involves a more instrumental use of transparency and participation;
they are used to inform stakeholders of the program's activities and to solicit advice to make fisheries assessments credible. The FSC, by contrast, treats transparency and participation more as ends unto themselves. With accountability, the programs are more similar, both treating transparency as a tool for accountability. They have each continually increased the checks on and openness of auditing practices by introducing new requirements for certifiers and methodologies for ensuring consistency across assessments.
Our second comparative focus examines how the transparency provisions of individual non-state certification programs interact to affect the learning potential of the private regulatory field. We find uneven diffusion of leading disclosure practices undertaken by the MSC and FSC, particularly the disclosure of auditing reports. Carbon-offset verifiers such as the American Carbon Registry, Verified Carbon Standard and Climate Action Reserve have adopted this practice. However, other programs within the forestry and fishery sector have not done so nor has the joint initiative of the Rainforest Alliance and the Sustainable Agriculture Network, a program active in certifying many agricultural commodities.
This inconsistency has implications for the learning capacity of non-state certification programs. Later programs can benefit from the transparency of early programs, but then not disclose their own lessons to inform future developments of the certification field as a whole. A key challenge we therefore stress is how the marketization of information-in this case 5 Auld 2009. knowledge about the operation of non-state certification becoming privately controlled and exchanged-requires careful attention if the transformative potential of certification is likely to be realized. 6 Our analysis proceeds in four parts. First, drawing an analytic distinction between outcome and procedural transparency, we review the links between transparency and (1) programmatic legitimacy and accountability and (2) learning within and across non-state certification initiatives. Second, we examine the transparency requirements of the MSC and FSC.
Third, we explore the effects of procedural and outcome transparency for goals of legitimacy and accountability and then assess links between outcome transparency and the field-level learning capacity of non-state certification program.
Embracing transparency and disclosure
The information provided by an eco-label is only one reason and-in our assessment-not the most important reason why certification is an example of governance by disclosure. 7 First, eco-labels provide limited information; consumers that buy labeled products essentially have to trust the label. Absent public outreach and marketing, most consumers cannot be expected to critically assess labeling requirements and then make informed choices about whether or not to buy a labeled product. Though some labels provide extensive on-product informationnutritional labels for instance-this approach is rare among non-state certification programs.
Second, research shows that NGO targeting of major buyers that then demand certified products from their supply chains has contributed more to the growth and spread of non-state certification programs than has consumer demand. With certification, the focal actors for procedural transparency are decision-makers.
Information about decision-making processes made public can be a means to meet all the abovementioned policy goals. First, accountability may improve, as information about decision-making 9 Mitchell 2011. 10 Auld and Gulbrandsen 2010 11 Vermeule 2007, 187 . 12 Mitchell 2011; Esty 2006 Esty , 1514 Gupta 2008 . 13 Mitchell 2011. 14 Vermeule 2007, 187; Mitchell 1998. This second part of our analysis is, then, a plausibility probe for the argument that without disclosure about the effects of non-state certification, collective learning to advance effectiveness will be difficult. Absent disclosure requirements, later programs can copy aspects of early programs without having to disclose their own lessons learned, thus hampering learning and innovation. Though many design characteristics may be copied, 25 we focus on outcome transparency since it is arguably critical for learning about programmatic effects.
Institutionalizing transparency and disclosure: Comparing the MSC and FSC
This section reviews procedural and outcome transparency provisions in the FSC's and MSC's rule-making and auditing processes ( unions; contractors; and representatives of forest industry and forest owners. 38 In a language readily understood in the region, the certifier must contact stakeholders about the assessment and indicate that their input will inform the localization of the "generic" standard for the assessment.
The standard must also be made available on the certifier's website.
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The MSC, while emulating the FSC's approach to setting global principles and criteria, the role of localization was given to certifiers. 40 As with the FSC, applicants can undergo a confidential pre-assessment that identifies steps the operation will need to take prior to a full assessment. 41 Public notice is required prior to the full assessment, which is when work similar to that done by FSC National Initiatives begins. Initially, expert assessment teams were given discretion to develop performance indicators and scoring guideposts for evaluating the candidate fishery. Although guided by previous assessments, the aim was to have operation-specific measures. Since 2001, however, the MSC has been working on the consistency and reliability of assessments. In July 2008, it introduced a new fisheries assessment methodology that provides a default assessment tree, from which certifiers must now build performance indicators and scoring guideposts.
42
During the assessment, the applicant fishery is required to provide information that will allow the assessment team to score the fishery; the assessment team interviews relevant stakeholders and takes account of concerns relating to management and sustainability of the public comment. Stakeholders may also object to the final certification decision, which activates an objections procedure. All relevant assessment documents are posted on the MSC webpage.
These documents include a number of stakeholder notifications, a public comment draft report, final report and determination, a public certification report, and annual surveillance reports. When relevant, a summary report of the objections panel and other relevant documents from the objections procedure are also posted on the website. Early concerns about the MSC centered on its governance. These came even though it was also being championed for its transparent consultation process. 56 Still, a series of articles in Samudra raised numerous criticisms of the MSC, including the concern that it would marginalize smallscale fishers, particularly in the South. In this respect, it was not a matter of whether consultations were transparent, but rather whether stakeholders were adequately involved in discussions about MSC's goals.
The MSC was responsive to these concerns. Indeed, a MSC founder contributing to the Samudra debates noted that membership had been discussed during the standards-development workshops and was still under consideration. 57 It was then addressed in the 2001 governance review, which considered membership a possible way to increase the active engagement and investment of NGOs and retailers in the MSC. 58 Yet, instead of promoting membership, the review re-affirmed the value of a streamlined governance organization. At the time, the MSC explained:
Many funders and NGOs in particular raised the question of a 'democratic deficit' in the organisation's structure. Comparisons were made with the seemingly more open Forest Stewardship Council (FSC). Some felt that in order for the MSC to be truly accountable to all its stakeholders, the organisation should be membership based. This was, rightly in the view of many, rejected and some argue that the FSC's experience has vindicated that decision.
59
Consistent with our argument, this exemplifies the different approach the MSC has taken to garnering support as a governance organization.
Turning to the FSC, the choice to devolve some authority to National Initiatives and to base the program's legitimacy more completely on the support of members is an alternative approach. One implication has been that stakeholders supporting the FSC have had an easier time 57 This discretionary power has been criticized because it purportedly undermines the credibility of the FSC given lack of effective control mechanisms. 67 Additionally, it relates to a broader concern that too much power for auditors undermines the authority given to National Initiatives.
The two different approaches to standard setting offered by the FSC have meant that in certain cases, stakeholder involvement has been extensive and rich, whereas in other cases standard setting has been much less visible and participatory. This is tricky for the FSC. The National
Initiatives and their extensive engagement with national stakeholders are partly the basis for its
legitimacy. Yet, the National Initiatives have often been hard to coordinate, they are resourceintensive to maintain, and slow at getting standards drafted. 68 In response, the FSC has been reaffirming its commitment to its global network and focusing on ensuring "integrity, credibility and transparency of the FSC system." 69 This has included introducing some flexibility by permitting standards work to occur in countries without National Initiatives. 70 The new standard for FSC accreditation that became operational in January 2010 also increases provisions for stakeholder engagement in the adaptation of a certifier's generic standard for a given assessment. In sum, the MSC and FSC pursued different means of legitimation, one that uses procedural transparency and stakeholder consultation instrumentally and the other where these provisions are ends unto themselves.
Accountability
The MSC and FSC both treat auditing as a means for accountability (Table 1) . But early experiences with scrutiny from concerned stakeholders quickly instructed that transparency and participation were required to ensure the program and its image remained intact. to improve transparency. 73 Likewise, a report commissioned by the Homeland Foundation, Oak
Foundation and Pew Charitable Trust released in 2004 urged the MSC to address several issues, with some focused specifically on the accreditation and certification processes, including:
"Ensure transparency in all documents and decision-making as much as possible."
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The FSC faced similar early criticism. One of the first was SmartWood's certification of Flor y Fauna in 1995. 75 The issues surrounded pre-existing scrutiny of the company in the Netherlands; links between the WWF Netherlands, a Dutch insurance and banking group, and the FSC, all of whom were endorsing Flor y Fauna; and questions about the company's growth-andyield and pricing expectations. 76 Though the assessment began in 1993-before the FSC accredited SmartWood-it still raised concerns about the credibility of the assessment processes.
This was followed in 1996 and 1997 by disquiet over an SGS assessment of Leroy Gabon, particularly due to the company's operations near a forest reserve, and as some groups asserted, the limited stakeholder consultations and insufficient management plan. 77 In this case, the FSC eventually suspended SGS's forest-management accreditation pending certain changes to its procedures, and it requested that all accredited certifiers respect a six-month moratorium on certifying primary forests.
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Responding to these concerns, the MSC and FSC have modified their accreditation processes, increasing procedural and outcome transparency such as requiring the disclosure of the public summary reports for certification assessments. This advances accountability as skeptical groups and individuals are able to trace the corrective action requirements imposed on companies The MSC and FSC have not perfectly converged in their approach to using transparency for accountability. Unlike the FSC, the MSC does not make accreditation reports available on its website. Still, both programs have been consistently increasing checks on and openness of their auditing processes through new stakeholder engagement requirements during the assessment process. 80 This underscores the general connection within non-state certification between transparency and participation, on the one hand, and accountability on the other.
Learning Capacity
Turning the lens to the field-level effects of transparency, here we examine other programs in the forest and fishery sectors. Considerable work has documented how lateremerging programs have learned from first-movers, both within issue areas and across them. FSC as transparent emerged as much from its openness to stakeholders, the power of membership provisions, and the devolution of decision-making power to National Initiatives as from its specific requirements for procedural and outcome transparency.
Both programs have sought to improve accountability by using procedural and outcome transparency, such as publicizing summarized assessment reports and increasing online disclosure of audit outcomes. Whereas this increased disclosure may boost credibility of forest and fisheries certification to some while reinforcing the skepticism of others, with few exceptions it has been a critical tool for furthering MSC and FSC accountability. Our claim is that although increased disclosure might not have convinced skeptical stakeholders of the merits of certification, most stakeholders would agree that it has enhanced their ability to scrutinize accreditation and certification practices. Procedural and outcome transparency have improved the conditions for holding both certifiers and companies to account for their practices.
This final point is crucial when we turn to assessing the diffusion of disclosure among a broader set of non-state certification programs. In this comparator group, the MSC and FSC emerge as leaders, as few other initiatives disclose audit reports with similar detail. This incomplete disclosure presents challenges for fostering learning within this private governance field, as only certain lessons are being fed back into the system to inform future reforms. In the open-source software model, the licensing agreements stipulate that parties may openly use and modify software, but that subsequent innovations need to be fed back into the commons to facilitate future innovation and growth. Devising ways to emulate this practice appears to be an important challenge non-state certification programs face in ensuring market norms of private and paid-for access to information do not take away from the transformative learning that fields of private regulatory may be able to inspire. 
